Proposition

• CURIE: gmeow:Proposition
• IRI: https://blackcatinformatics.ca/gmeow/Proposition
• Category: class
• Defined by: gmeow:slices/epistemics

A truth-apt content — a described state of affairs that can be held true or false, the object of a doxastic attitude (gmeow:believes, gmeow:knowsThat). Existing by social convention like every description, it is a gmeow:SocialObject. A Proposition asserts nothing by itself: that an agent holds it, and with what modality, is a vantage-indexed claim (Principle 9). It is the doxastic sibling of gmeow:Goal (teleology): a belief and a goal may share the SAME proposition but differ in direction of fit — a belief has mind-to-world fit (it aims to be true to the world), a goal has world-to-mind fit (it aims to make the world true to it).

Structure

Subclass of: gmeow:SocialObject

Practical Pattern

Use gmeow:Proposition as a specialized kind of gmeow:SocialObject. Add statement metadata or a standpoint when the assertion needs provenance, confidence, or vantage.

Example Snippets

These snippets are generated from canonical slice examples and trimmed to the Turtle blocks where this term appears.

Belief And Knowledge

• Source: slices/core/epistemics/examples/belief-and-knowledge.ttl
• Examples catalog: open in catalog#example-slices-core-epistemics-examples-belief-and-knowledge

@prefix gmeow: <https://blackcatinformatics.ca/gmeow/> .
@prefix ex:    <https://example.org/> .
@prefix rdfs:  <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> .



ex:earthOrbitsSun  a gmeow:Proposition ; rdfs:label "the Earth orbits the Sun"@en .
ex:coffeeIsHealthy a gmeow:Proposition ; rdfs:label "coffee is healthy"@en .
ex:nullHypothesis  a gmeow:Proposition ; rdfs:label "the null hypothesis, assumed for the test"@en .
ex:lifeOnEuropa    a gmeow:Proposition ; rdfs:label "there is life on Europa"@en .

Common Companion Terms

gmeow:SocialObject

Usage Advice

Use when

• Use to mint a truth-apt content as its own object — the thing an agent believes, doubts, accepts, or knows-that — so the same proposition can be held by several agents with different modalities, each holding indexed to a vantage (Principle 9).

Avoid when

• Avoid asserting the proposition as a global fact (it asserts nothing by itself — that an agent holds it, and how, is a vantage-indexed claim, never a factive knowledge verdict); avoid subsuming a gmeow:Goal under it, which would erase the direction-of-fit distinction.

How to use

• Mint the Proposition once, link agents to it through the flat doxastic spine (gmeow:believes, gmeow:doubts, gmeow:accepts, gmeow:knowsThat), and carry how-strongly / from-whose-vantage on gmeow:standpointModality and gmeow:accordingTo of the holding statement; a co-aimed goal references the same proposition rather than subclassing it.

Scope notes

• Direction-of-fit bridge (documentation only — no axiom, no teleology dependency): belief --mind-to-world--> Proposition <--world-to-mind-- Goal. There is deliberately NO gmeow:Goal rdfs:subClassOf gmeow:Proposition; subsumption would erase the direction-of-fit distinction, so the link stays by reference.

Examples

• ex:earthIsRound a gmeow:Proposition; rdfs:label "the Earth is round"@en.